Internet voting in Pakistan: A risky gamble with democracy

In 2018, Pakistan’s Election Commission convened a task force to audit iVOTE, an internet voting platform for overseas citizens. Their findings were serious: the system lacked ballot secrecy, enabled voter coercion, and was vulnerable to phishing and DDoS attacks. Three years later, these concerns still remain relevant.

The Internet Voting Task Force (IVTF) report exposed critical flaws. Without polling booths, votes can be bought or coerced, a risk heightened for overseas Pakistanis beyond the Election Commission’s jurisdiction. Phishing tests showed fake NADRA emails redirecting voters to fraudulent sites, exploiting low tech literacy. iVOTE also relied on third-party security components with known vulnerabilities, while weak governance left key processes undefined. “Deploying iVOTE now would be premature with significant risks,” the IVTF concluded.

Some argue that blockchain and encryption can improve security. Block360, a local tech startup, developed a blockchain-based system using homomorphic encryption and threshold cryptography to protect ballot secrecy and reduce insider threats. Yet, experts warn that technology alone cannot eliminate the risks of remote voting. Estonia, once a leader in internet voting, had to adopt additional verification systems after years of scrutiny. Pakistan’s infrastructural challenges of limited internet access and frequent data breaches continue to undermine trust.

The IVTF recommended safer alternatives. Embassy-based voting preserves ballot secrecy, while postal voting, though imperfect, limits large-scale fraud. In the long term, Pakistan needs a dedicated research team to assess secure voting models rather than adopting unproven technology too quickly.

Innovation in elections must be balanced with security. Block360’s encryption methods are promising, but as the IVTF cautioned, election integrity requires careful testing. Pakistan must ensure any new system is both reliable and widely trusted.